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The Propriety of Jury
Questioning: A Remedy for
Perceived Harmless Error
In May of 1999, in United States v. Hernandez,' the Third Circuit ruled on a
case of first impression.' Courts commonly rule on issues of first impression;
every time a new legal issue is developed or a new rule of law is formed, cases of
first impression arise. Hernandez is unique because it is a ruling of first
impression that is not based upon a new legal issue or a new rule of law.3
Hernandez addresses the current practice of allowing jurors to question witnesses
in criminal trials,4 a practice utilized in the United States since at least 1825,' and
in England since the 18th Century.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORY OF JUROR QUESTIONING WITNESSES
The first time any court in the United States addressed the issue of whether
jurors could question witnesses was in a 1895 civil case, Schaefer v. St. Louis &
Suburban Railway Company.6 The court in Schaefer explicitly allowed jurors to
question the witnesses.7 Soon thereafter in 1907, as a result of State v. Kendall,8
North Carolina became one of the first states to formally permit juror questioning
of witnesses, as long as the purpose was to elicit the truth.9 It was not until 1954
that the first federal appellate court issued an opinion on the subject. " In United
States v. Witt, " the Second Circuit ruled that allowing jurors to question witnesses
is totally within judicial discretion. 2 The court based its holding on the decision
in United States v. Rosenberg,3 which upheld the practice of judges questioning
1. 176 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1999)
2. Id. at 723.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision
Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 259, 262 (1997).
6. 30 S.W. 331 (Mo. 1895).
7. Id. at 333.
8. 57 S.E. 340,341 (N.C. 1907).
9. Amy Witherite, Jurors May Indirectly Question Witnesses During Trial: Allen v. State, 807
S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. granted), 23 TEX. TECH L. REv. 663, 667-68
(1992).
10. Seeid.at664&n.0.
11. 215 F.2d580, 584 (2dCir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954).
12. Id. at 584.
13. 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952).
witnesses." Forty-five years later, notwithstanding a multitude of cases of first
impression and further discussions in between, we have yet another case of first
impression in the Third Circuit, United States v. Hernandez.Is The Hernandez
court held that juror questioning of witnesses can occur "so long as it is done in
a manner that insures the fairness of the proceedings, the primacy of the court's
stewardship, and the rights of the accused."' 6
The cases decided between Witt and Hernandez that discuss the propriety of
allowing jurors to question witnesses, spawned considerable controversy over the
practice. 7 Despite the controversy, allowing jurors to question witnesses became
current trial practice in many circuits and states.'8 However, problems inherent
in the practice are enumerated in almost every on-point opinion. 9 Every circuit
that has addressed the issue has vehemently stressed that the practice is
dangerous.2" Additionally, most courts strongly discouraged its use and stated that
the practice should be used sparingly" and only in the most complex criminal
cases, 22 such as antitrust or conspiracy.23
With few exceptions, every case that discussed the appropriateness of allowing
jurors to question witnesses stated that the implementation of the practice is a
matter of judicial discretion.24 The courts, however, then backpedaled and ended
14. Id. at593-94.
15. 176 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1999).
16. Id. at 723.
17. Witherite, supra note 10, at 664-69.
18. See Wolff, supra note 6, at 818.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that the
procedure is "fraught with perils" and that a judge who utilizes the practice should attempt to lessen the
"inherent dangers"); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1985)
(stating that there are considerable dangers in the practice); United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333,336 (7th
Cir. 1996) (stating that "[w]itness questioning by jurors is fraught with risks."); United States v. Johnson,
914 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the practice is "fraught with danger and borders on a
finding of prejudice per se."). See also State v. LeMaster, 669 P.2d 592, 597- 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)
(stating that there is the danger that the jury will not remain fair and impartial); State v. Graves, 907 P.2d
963,965 (Mont. 1995) (quoting DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516); State v. Jumpp, 619 A.2d 602, 610 (N.J.
1993) (listing the dangers inherent in the practice).
20. See id.
21. See United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the practice is to be
used only in extraordinary or compelling circumstances); Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005 (stating that while the
practice is not forbidden, it should be used sparingly).
22. See United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1017 (1 st Cir. 1993) (stating that the practice is not
prejudicial per se in complex cases); United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that there may be criminal cases, such as conspiracy or anti-trust, where the facts are
complicated and therefore jurors should be allowed to ask questions).
23. Id.
24. See Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005 (stating that the matter is "committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court."); Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1018 (explaining that the trial court has broad discretion over procedural
trial matters); Witt, 215 F.2d at 584 (holding that jurors questioning of witnesses is within the judge's
discretion); DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516 (finding that although distinguishable, both juror questioning
and questioning of jurors by a judge are matters within the trial court's discretion); Feinberg, 89 F.3d at
337 (explaining that the decision to allow jurors to question witnesses is most appropriately left to the trial
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with a caveat that they strongly discourage the practice because it is so
dangerous."
In addition to the arguments found in case law, there exists some argument
that the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) offers guidance on this subject, in the
form of FRE 611 (a). 6 One such argument is that the language of FRE 611 (a),27
which gives the court the power to decide the "mode and order" of witnesses,
allows the court to invite jurors to question witnesses.28 However, nothing in the
Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 611 suggests or even implies that it be used for
this purpose.2 9
In addition to the FRE 611(a) argument, courts and commentators have
proposed that Federal Rule of Evidence 614(b)3° embodies the acceptance of the
practice.3 The Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 614(b) state that the authority
of the judge to question witnesses is well-established, but the rule never mentions
the jury in connection with such authority.32 The Notes to FRE 614(b) do,
however, state that judges abuse their roles as questioner when they become
advocates,33 which will be discussed in depth in Part III.
This comment in Part II will identify and discuss the concerns and issues
surrounding the current practice of allowing jurors to question witnesses in
criminal trials.34 Part III considers what "judicial discretion" means and its
judge's discretion); United States v. George, 986 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8th Cir. 1993) (reiterating that the
practice is committed to the discretion of the trial court). See also Graves, 907 P.2d at 966-67; Flores v.
State, 965 P.2d 901, 902 (Nev. 1998); Jumpp, 619 A.2d at 611; Cohee v. State, 942 P.2d 211,213-14
(Okla. 1997); Williams v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
25. See Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 337 (stating that the process is not prejudicial per se, but that the risks
outweigh the benefits); DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 517 (holding process is not prejudicial, but that the
practice is "fraught with peril"); Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005 (finding use not prejudicial per se, but that the
"game will not be worth the candle."); United States v. Johnson, 914 F.2d 136, 138 (8 ' Cir. 1990).
26. FED. R. EviD. 611 (a). See also DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515 (stating that the Federal Rules of
Evidence neither allow nor disallow the practice, but 611 (a) offers some guidance).
27. Rule 611 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: The court shall exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth,'(2) avoid needless consumption
of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. FED. R. EvtD. 611 (a).
28. See DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515.
29. See FED. R. EvID. 611 advisory committee's notes.
30. Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "The court may interrogate witnesses, whether
called by itself or by a party." FED. R. EvtD. 614(b).
31. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1952) (stating that judges should
pose questions to clear up misunderstandings). See also, Jeffrey Reynolds Sylvester, Your Honor, May I
Ask a Question? The Inherent Dangers of Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses 7 CooLEY L. REV.
213, 216 n.30 (1990) (arguing that juror questioning is supported by Federal Rule of Evidence 614(b)).
32. FED. R. Ev[D. 614(b) advisory committee's notes.
33. Id.
34. See discussion infra Part II.
relation to the process of juror questioning.35 Part IV will examine the current
practice of each of the Federal Circuits and a representative sampling of state
courts.36 Part V advocates a blanket rule banning the practice of juror questioning
in criminal trials and, as an alternative, encourages the implementation of a new
Rule of Federal Evidence or Criminal Procedure to safeguard against the perils
inherent in the practice of allowing jurors to question witnesses in criminal trials. 7
Finally, Part VI concludes the comment.3"
II. INHERENT DANGERS AND ISSUES ENUMERATED
First and foremost, the practice of allowing jurors to ask questions "creates the
risk that jurors [untrained in the law and rules of evidence] will ask prejudicial or
improper questions."39 "[T]he potential risk that ajuror question will be improper
or prejudicial is simply greater than a trial court should take .... ,,' When jurors
are not trained in the rules of evidence, courts that allow jurors to question
witnesses may encounter situations where a juror wants an improper/prejudicial
question asked of a witness and the question is irrelevant or simply cannot be
allowed due to prior motion or hearsay exclusion. The court, therefore, may be left
with a juror who retains the improper mind-set that generated the unanswered
question. 4
1
A number of courts cite their most troubling concern as the danger that the
process of asking questions has the great possibility of turning the jury into
advocates for one side or another.42 When jurors turn to advocacy, they abandon
their primary responsibility to remain neutral fact-finders. 43 There is an intrinsic
difficulty with being an active participant in a trial while remaining a detached
observer.4 Ifjurors become involved in the questioning of witnesses they may feel
35. See discussion infra Part III.
36. See discussion infra Part IV.
37. See discussion infra Part V.
38. See discussion infra Part VI.
39. United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the risks inherent in juror
questioning of witnesses); United States v. Douglas, 81 F.3d 324, 326 (2d Cir. 1996); DeBenedetto v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512,516 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d 604,
606 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Brockman, 183 F.3d 891,899 (8th Cir. 1999); State v. LeMaster, 669
P.2d 592,597 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Jeffries, 644 S.W.2d 432,434-35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982);
Williams v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
40. DeBenedeno, 754 F.2d at 516.
41. See id.
42. Bush, 47 F.3d at 515; Douglas, 81 F.3d at 326; United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333,336 (7th
Cir. 1996); Groene, 998 F.2d at 606; Brockman, 183 F.3d at 899, Jeffries, 644 S.W.2d at 435; Williams,
484 S.E.2d at 155.
43. See generally Bush, 47 F.3d at 515 (citing United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707,711 (8th Cir.
1989)(observing that the "most troubling concern is that the practice risks turning jurors into advocates,
compromising their neutrality.")); Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 336 ("If permitted to go too far, examination by
jurors may convert the jurors to adversely compromising their neutrality.").
44. Bush, 47 F.3dat515.
440
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that they have an investment in the outcome and lose the neutrality and
detachment that is required of a neutral fact-finder, in order to preserve the
defendant's rights.45
Another frequently cited danger is that the practice may cause premature
deliberation among the jury.' The questioning of witnesses by jurors reflects the
jury's premature consideration of the evidence prior to the commencement of their
deliberation.47
In addition, when jurors are given the opportunity after every witness to
formulate and write out questions they want submitted to the court and asked of
the witness, this not only constitutes deliberation, but also unfailingly delays the
pace of the trial.4 Such actions are diametrically opposed to the sought after goals
of judicial economy and efficiency.49
The final frequently cited inherent danger is that the practice of jury
questioning subjects the objecting party/counsel to the possibility of alienating the
jury.' Objecting in the presence of the jury, or with the jury's knowledge of who
objected, "[i]mpale[s] attorneys on the horns of a dilemma."'" If a procedure is not
implemented for allowing attorneys to make objections outside of the jury's
presence, the attorney must decide whether to alienate a juror by objecting to his
question or to prejudice his own client by failing to object. This dilemma creates
an awkwardness for the lawyer who wants to object to the juror's question, but
who cannot afford to alienate any member of the jury.52
45. Id.
46. Id. See also United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1995) (arguing that "if allowed to
formulate questions throughout the trial,jurors may prematurely evaluate the evidence and adopt a position
as to the weight of that evidence before considering all the facts... [and such] premature deliberation...
can be highly prejudicial."); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that
"[s]uch questioning tends to ... encourage premature deliberations .... ); DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 517
("To the extent that such juror questions reflect consideration of the evidence-and such questions inevitably
must do so-that, at the least, the questioning juror has begun the deliberating process' with his fellow
jurors."); Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 336 (citing Bush, the Feinberg court states that "Jurors may [also] begin
premature deliberations."); Groene, 998 F.2d at 606 ("[Tjhe process of formulating questions may
precipitate prematurely the deliberation phase of the trial .... ); Brockman, 183 F.3d at 899, quoting
Groen, 998 F.2d at 606; Williams, 484 S.E.2d at 155 (citing DeBenedetto, the Williams court observed
that "juror questioning may encourage premature deliberation."). *
47. See DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 517; Brockman, 183 F.3d at 899; Thompson, 76 F.3d at 448.
48. United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (Ist Cir. 1992); Ajmal, 67 F.3d at 14; Thompson,
76 F.3d at 448; State v. LeMaster, 669 P.2d 592, 606 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
49. See Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005; Ajmal, 67 F.3d at 14; Thompson, 76 F.3d at 448; LeMaster, 669
P.2d at 597.
50. Bush, 47 F.3d at 515; Ajmal, 67 F.3d at 14; Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 336-37.
51. See Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 336 (quoting Bush, 47 F.3d at 515).
52. See generally Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005.
III. JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Judicial discretion is "equated with 'sound judgment of the court to be
exercised according to the rules of law."' 53 It is described as "the option the trial
judge has in doing or not doing a thing that cannot be demanded by a litigant as
an absolute right ..... ,
Unlike the criminal defendant who has an absolute right to a fair and
impartial fact-finder,55 jurors have no absolute right to question witnesses. 6 As
a result of leaving the issue to a trial court's discretion, a judge can decide whether
or not he thinks, in his "sound judgment," the questioning of witnesses by the
jurors is proper. An important question is what constitutes the complexity
required by many jurisdictions before the procedure should be implemented.
Equally important a question is whether the judge is best suited to determine if a
jury of lay persons will or will not understand the case.
A point often overlooked by many commentators is that most of these cases
are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Although most courts find an inherent error
in the practice ofjuror questioning, they inevitably, with few exceptions, conclude
that the error was harmless to the defendant. Error, even though harmless, is still
error, and a constant stream of cases illustrating such an error in the system should
signal that a remedy is needed.
Abuse of discretion is aptly defined as "a clearly erroneous conclusion and
judgment-one that is clearly against the logic and effect of such facts as are
presented.... ."' It is also considered an unreasonable departure from considered
precedents and settled judicial custom, and it constitutes an error of law. 8 Under
this definition, allowing jurors to question witnesses will very rarely be an abuse
of discretion because of existing precedent and judicial custom on the subject.
Unfortunately, if reasonable men can differ about the propriety of the action taken
by the trial court, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion.59
"Men" differ on the question of allowing juror questioning,' but only two
circuits have held that the practice constitutes an abuse of discretion. 6 Where so
many differ on the propriety of the subject, is the correct standard abuse of
53. People v. Russel, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 215 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Lent v. Tillson, 14 P. 71,78 (Cal.
1887)).
54. Kasper v. Helfrich, 421 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
56. State v. Graves, 907 P.2d 963, 966-67 (Mont. 1995).
57. State v. Draper, 27 P.2d 39,50 (Utah 1933) (quoting Starr v. State, 115 P. 356, 363 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1911)).
58. Beck v. Wings Field, Inc., 122 F.2d 114, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1941).
59. Kasper, 421 S.W.2d at 69.
60. See discussion infra Part III.
61. United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442,
449 (2d Cir. 1996).
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discretion? Are we to stand by while the courts abuse their discretion, hiding
behind the argument that such abuse is not prejudicial to the defendantT
IV. THE CURRENT PRACTICE: EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL CIRCUITS AND
STATE COURTS
A. Federal Review
The United States Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari to cases
arguing whether the practice of allowing jurors to question witnesses is prejudicial
per se or a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.62 In addition, the
federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue of juror questioning of
witnesses have failed to establish a bright line rule against the practice. Instead,
they strongly discourage its use, after noting each and every danger involved in the
process.63
1. First Circuit
The First Circuit, on three occasions during the 1990's, discussed whether
jurors are allowed to question witnesses.' The court consistently stated that the
trial court may utilize the practice as it is not prejudicial per se65 and is allowable
within a trial court's discretion.' However, both United States v. Sutton and
United States v. Cassiere state that judges should employ the practice sparingly,
only in complex cases, and the practice should be the exception, not the rule.67
62. Wolff, supra note 6, at 820; Leonard Pertnoy, The Juror's Need to Know vs. The Constitutional
Right to a Fair Trial, 97 DtCK. L. REV. 627, 635 (1993) ("The Supreme Court has yet to pass on the
constitutionality ofjuror questioning."); Sylvester, supra note 32, at 216 (1990); Judge Anthony Valen,
Jurors Asking Questions: Revolutionary or Evolutionary?, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 423,430 (1993) (stating
that "[tihe United States Supreme Court has passed up many opportunities to rule on [juror questioning].").
63. United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (IstCir. 1992); United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511,
515 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Amjal, 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. DeBenedetto,
754 F.2d 512, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Groene, 998 F. 2d 604, 606 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Brockman, 183 F.3d 891,
899 (8th Cir. 1999).
64. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1001; United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1 st Cir. 1993); United States v.
Rivera-Santiago, 107 F.3d 960 (1st Cir. 1997).
65. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005; Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1018.
66. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005.
67. Id. (holding that the practice "should be the long-odds exception, not the rule."); Cassiere, 4 F.3d
at 1018 (reiterating Sutton and stating that "the practice should be reserved for exceptional situations, and
should not become the routine, even in complex cases").
In Sutton, the trial judge gave the jury preliminary instructions to inform them
that they could ask questions of witnesses and to outline a simple procedure for
what each juror should do if he or she had a question.' During the trial, the judge
received a question from the jury asking if they were able to submit questions to
a witness while the witness was testifying on the stand.69 The judge answered in
the affirmative, stating that this "is the essence of your right to ask questions. '"70
Throughout the trial, juror-inspired questions were asked of witnesses, with
defense counsel usually objecting to the question being asked.7 The defendant
was convicted, and he appealed, asserting that the practice was inherently
prejudicial." On appeal, the court held that, in this case, the practice was not
prejudicial per se, but stated that the practice was to be the "long odds-
exception."73 The court also outlined the dangers inherent in allowing jurors to
question witnesses.74
The following year in Cassiere, the court took this enumeration a step further
and outlined the prophylactic procedures that the trial court should use in the
exceptional cases where the questioning of witnesses by jurors was appropriate.
During the Cassiere trial,76 the court told the jury that they could ask questions of
the witnesses and explained that they had to be in written form.7 By the end of
the trial, the court asked eleven juror-inspired questions to various witnesses.78
Defendants did not object to the practice, nor did they object to any specific
questions.79 The court held that due to the factual complexity of the case, there
was no plain error when the court implemented procedural safeguards and the
68. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1003.
69. Id. at 1003.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1004.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1005. The Sutton court identified the following dangers of this practice: (1) it will transform
jurors from passive to active participants; (2) it will delay the trial; (3) create awkwardness for attorneys;
and (4) may undermine litigation strategies. See id.
74. Id.
75. See United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1018 (1 st Cir. 1993). The court in Cassiere articulated
the following procedural protections for use of this practice:
The district court should inform counsel at the earliest possible time of its intention to use this
technique and allow counsel the opportunity to object. The court should instruct the jurors that
they should limit their questions to important points, that at times the rules of evidence will
dictate that the court not ask a question, and that the jurors should draw no implication from the
court's failure to pose ajuror-proposed question to the [witness]. The jurors should reduce their
questions to writing and pass them to the court. Before asking a question, the court should offer
a sidebar conference to give counsel the opportunity to object.
Id.
76. United States v. Cassiere involved the trial of two criminal defendants, Joseph N. Cassiere and
Janet M. Pezzullo, who were convicted of federal wire fraud and conspiracy, stemming from a scheme
designed to defraud mortgage lenders. Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1006.
77. Id.at 1O16.
78. Id.at117.
79. Id.
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defense failed to object to the questions when they were asked.80 The Cassiere
court concluded by re-enumerating the procedural safeguards identified in
Sutton."'
2. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit first addressed the issue of jurors questioning witnesses
in 1954 in United States v. Witt 2 and found it to be valid under Federal Rule of
Evidence 614(b). 3 In Witt, the defendants were tried and convicted for conspiring
to defraud the United States.' Jurors asked questions of the witnesses, and the
defendants included this issue in their appeal.8 5 The court found that jurors asking
questions is allowable because it is "like witness-questioning by the judge
himself."'
In 1995, the circuit again addressed the issue in United States v. Bush." In
Bush, the trial court did not give pre-trial instructions regarding juror questioning,
but nevertheless allowed the jurors to question the defendant to clarify his
testimony." The circuit court held that while the practice is within the discretion
of the trial judge, its use is strongly discouraged.8 9 The court stated that the "most
troubling concern" with the practice of juror questioning is that it will turn jurors
into advocates, cause them to ask inappropriate or improper questions, and at the
very least, encourage premature deliberation.9
Ironically, later the same year, the Second Circuit decided United States v.
Ajmal,9 ' and overturned the defendant's conviction after determining that the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing jurors to question witnesses.92 In Ajmal, the
80. Id.at117-18.
81. Id. at 1018; see also supra note 76 (outlining the procedural protections used when allowing juror
questioning).
82. 215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1954).
83. Id. at 584 (relying on United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583,593-94 (2dCir. 1952)). See also
FED. RULE EVID. 614(b), supra note 28.
84. Witt, 215F.2dat581.
85. id. at 584.
86. Id.
87. 47 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1995). Defendant Bush was tried and convicted of armed bank robbery and
other related charges. Id. at 512.
88. Id. at 512-14.
89. Id. at 515.
90. Id.
91. 67 F.3d 12 (2dCir. 1995).
92. Id. at 15 ("such questioning tainted the trial process .... Accordingly, the district court's
solicitation of juror questioning absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances was an abuse of
discretion.").
Second Circuit determined that the factual circumstances of the case did not
warrant the court inviting jurors to question witnesses.93 The court held that an
abuse of discretion occurred because: 1) the decision to invite the questioning was
not caused by a complex fact pattern; 2) the decision was made as a matter of
routine; 3) the jurors took extensive use of the invitation, even to the extent of
questioning the criminal defendant; 4) this promoted premature deliberation
because thejurors were allowed to pose "non-fact-clarifying questions;" and 5) this
caused the jurors to turn from "neutral fact-finder to inquisitor and advocate."'
Interestingly enough, the court quickly reiterated that even though they still
found that juror questioning was within a trial court's discretion, in order to
properly exercise this discretion, the trial courts must balance the benefits and
disadvantages of allowing such questioning.95
Most recently, in United States v. Douglas," the Second Circuit held that
encouraging juror questioning was not a basis for disturbing a conviction.97
Restating the inherent dangers in the practice,9" the court reminded the district
courts that the risks of adverse consequences render juror questioning of witnesses
"inappropriate for [the courts] to invite or encourage. 99
It appears that the only factor distinguishable between Ajmal and Douglas is
that where the court in Douglas did invite juror questioning, it did not abuse the
practice to the same extent that the Ajmal court did. " The court appeared to base
its holding on the fact that the jury only posed a few questions to the witnesses in
Douglas, and those questions were of slight significance. ' l This rationale begs
the question of whether the Second Circuit's future decisions regarding juror
questioning will rest on the number of questions asked and their significance to
the case, rather than the balancing of advantages and disadvantages that the circuit
court previously discussed. '02 However, counting the number of questions asked
by jurors requires an exhaustive case-by-case analysis because such an approach
commands an in-depth examination of the transcript, to determine the quantity of
questions asked and their significance to the case.
93. Id. at 14-15. Defendant was tried and convicted for possession of heroin with the intent to
distribute. Id. at 13.
94. Id. at 14-15.
95. Id. at 14.
96. 81 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 1996).
97. Id. at 326. The court determined that because the questions asked of witnesses were "few in number
and of slight significance" the error of the judge in inviting the questioning was harmless. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id; see also United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing that "the jurors
took extensive advantage of [the] opportunity to question witnesses... [and] tained the trial process .....
101. Douglas, 81 F.3d at 326.
102. See Ajmal, 67 F.3d at 14.
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3. Third Circuit
The 1999 case of United States v. Hernandez"3 that inspired this comment
was a case of first impression in the Third Circuit."' In Hernandez, the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy and receiving or possessing stolen goods."°5 The
district court allowed the jurors to write out their questions for the witnesses, but
the court reviewed the questions before they were asked of any witness."" The
court allowed the attorneys to look at the questions and make objections outside
of the presence of the jury." During the trial, a question was submitted through
this process, and the court declined to ask the question of the witness." 8 Instead,
the court allowed the attorneys to respond to the question." Defense counsel
objected, arguing that the question and its timeliness suggested premature
deliberations on behalf of the juror."0 The court overruled the objection."' On
appeal, the defense insisted that "permitting the jurors to act as inquisitors""'
denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment Rights."' The circuit court, as a
matter of first impression, affirmed the lower court's holding and approved the
practice "so long as it is done in a manner that insures the fairness of the
proceedings, the primacy of the court's stewardship, and the rights of the
accused.""' 4 The Third Circuit agreed that a judge wanting to allow juror
questions should adopt a procedure ensuring fairness, but failed to outline or
advocate any type of guidelines for implementation of the procedure." 5
4. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit decided in 1985 what many believe to be the seminal case
in this controversy, DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. 16 In
103. 176 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 723.
105. Id. at 721.
106. Id. at 722.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 723.
111. Id. The court found nothing in the wording of the question indicating "notions of guilt" on behalf
of the inquiring juror. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 726.
116. 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985).
DeBenedetto, a products liability case, the judge in his opening remarks to the jury
explained that he would allow the jurors to submit questions for the witnesses, and
if appropriate, the court would ask them."7 During the course of the trial, the
jurors submitted approximately ninety-five questions, half of which were submitted
by the jury foreman."' The defense did not object to the process at any time
during the trial.' However, on appeal, the defense argued that because "the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly permit this practice, it is error for a
trial court to permit it."'
The Fourth Circuit held that allowing juror questioning is well within a trial
court's discretion,12 ' but the court refuted the reliance on Federal Rule of Evidence
611 (a) as the underlying rationale for allowing the practice. 22 The court refused
to adopt a bright-line rule condemning the practice but stated in very strong
language that the practice is "fraught with dangers" becausejurors are not trained
in the law. 23 The court held that the potential risks inherent in juror questioning
are "simply greater than a trial court should take," absent compelling
circumstances. 
24
The year following DeBenedetto, in United States v. Polowichak, "2 the Fourth
Circuit disapproved of the practice of a court inviting or encouraging jurors to
question witnesses. 26  The Fourth Circuit stressed that if the district courts
117. d. at 515 n.1.
118. d. at 517.
119. Id. at 515.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 516.
122. Id. at 515. The court examined the argument that the Federal Rules of Evidence applied but held
that the Rules neither allow or disallow the practice. Id. The court rejected the argument that Federal Rule
of Evidence 611(a) governs by finding that juror inspired questions are "clearly and properly
distinguishable" from questioning by the trial judge. Id. at 515-16
123. Id. at 516-17. The DeBenedetto court outlined the inherent dangers as follows:
Our judicial system is founded upon the presence of a body constituted as a neutral factfinder
to discern the truth from the positions presented by the adverse parties .... Individuals not
trained in the law cannot be expected to know and understand what is legally relevant ... [and]
what is legally admissible.
Id. at 516. The court further stated that "since jurors are not trained in the law, the potential risk that ajuror
question will be improper or prejudicial is simply greater than a trial court should take...." Id. Questions
made within hearing of other jurors could evoke "mental reactions" among the other jurors. Id. If a
question is rejected, the jurors are "likely to retain whatever mind-set has been generated by the question,
leaving the court and counsel to ponder, under the stress of trial, how much influence a juror question,
answered or unanswered, may have had on the perceptions of the jury as a whole." Id. (emphasis in
original). In addition, "it is questionable how effective remedial steps are after the jury has heard the
question...."Id. "[R]emedial steps may well make the questioning juror feel abashed and uncomfortable,
and perhaps even angry if he feels his pursuit of truth has been thwarted by rules he does not understand."
Id. Strongerjurors may dominate the inquiries, and there exists a "possibility that the jury will attach more
significance to the answers to these jury questions .... Id. at 516-17. Furthermore, jurors who ask
questions have prematurely begun the deliberation process. Id. at 517.
124. Id.
125. 783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986).
126. Id. at 413.
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continue the practice, they are to "require jurors to submit questions in writing,
without disclosing the question to other jurors, whereupon the court may pose the
question in its original or restated form upon ruling the question or the substance
of the question proper.' ' 27
5. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Callahan, 28 upheld the practice of
allowing jurors to question witnesses.129 In Callahan, the defendant was convicted
of tax evasion and appealed his conviction, based partly on the argument that the
trial court encouraged jurors to question the witnesses."3 While the trial judge
informed the jurors that they should not hesitate to ask questions, he "explained
that he did not want to encourage jurors to ask large number of questions," and
only one question was actually submitted during the trial. 3'
The court held that there was nothing improper in allowing jurors to ask
questions.' The court rationalized that allowing jurors to question witnesses
ultimately causes a more complete development of the issues and facts of a case.'"I
The Fifth Circuit took the position that while the development of the case is most
important, the district courts need to balance the positives of questioning against
the possible abuses that are likely to occur."
6. Sixth Circuit
As of date, the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the question of whether jurors
may question witnesses.
7. Seventh Circuit
Another recent case of first impression lies in the Seventh Circuit. In 1996,
the Seventh Circuit ruled on United States v. Feinber, "' and found that the use of
127. id.
128. 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1979).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1081.
131. Id. at 1086.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1086. "[Q]uestion[s] should alert trial counsel that a particular factual issue may need more
extensive development." Id.
134. Id. at 1086-87 n.2.
135. 89 F.3d 333 (7th Cir. 1996).
the practice is a matter of judicial discretion. 6 In Feinberg, the judge, in his
pretrial instructions to the jury, stated:
Most of the testimony will be given in response to questions by the
attorneys .... When the attorneys have finished their questioning of a
witness . . .I shall ask you whether you have any questions of that
witness. If you do, address each of your questions to me, and if I decide
that it meets the legal rules, I shall ask it of the witness. After all of your
questions of a witness have been dealt with, the attorneys will have an
opportunity to ask the witness further about the subjects raised by your
questions. When you direct questions to me to be asked of the witness,
you may state them either orally or in writing.'37
During the trial, the jury asked ten questions.'38 The defense did not object
to either the judge's instructions nor any of the jurors' questions. '39 The defendant
appealed his conviction partially on the basis that permitting the jurors to ask
questions amounted to prejudice.'"
The Seventh Circuit stated that the practice is acceptable in some cases' 4' but
is generally not condoned. 42 The court stated that implicit in the practice is the
obligation of the district court to weigh the benefits against the potential harm. 43
Ultimately, the court concluded that "[iun the vast majority of cases the risks
outweigh the benefits."'"
8. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit that has exhaustively examined,
criticized, and ultimately approved the practice. In United States v. Land, " the
Eighth Circuit first held that the practice of juror questioning of witnesses could
only be reviewed for plain error.'" In Land, defense counsel failed to make
contemporaneous objections to juror questions."47 The court found that although
the trial court had no prior consideration of the questions that the jurors orally
136. Id. at 336.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 337. "There may be cases, such as conspiracy or antitrust cases, in which the facts are so
complicated that jurors should be allowed to ask questions in order to perform their duties." Id.
142. See id. at 336.
143. Id. at 337.
144. Id.
145. 877 F.2d 17 (8th Cir. 1989).
146. Jd. at 19.
147. Id.
450
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articulated to the witnesses, the only review on appeal could be for plain error,
absent objection by counsel.'4
Later that same year, the same court in United States v. Johnson (hereinafter
Johnson 1)49 followed the holding in Land, and due to a lack of objections to the
procedure during trial, found no grounds to overturn the conviction based upon
juror questioning. 1  However, the Johnson I court issued a warning to express
the risks of juror questioning and stressing the importance of having the jury
maintain their duty as neutral fact-finders.' 5'
Relying on Land, Johnson I, and United States v. Lewin, '52 in 1990 this circuit
decided United States v. Johnson (hereinafter Johnson II).' In Johnson II, the
defense counsel made objections to juror questions during trial, and the Eighth
Circuit held that review on appeal would be abuse of discretion, not plain error."M
However, the court ultimately found that the questioning in-this case was neither
an abuse of discretion nor plain error.'55
While in the past this circuit has held that "the use of the procedure itself is
not plain error,"'56 it consistently advocates the use of protection procedures in its
implementation. "' The Eighth Circuit regularly enumerates the dangers inherent
in the practice as follows: 1) the practice turns jurors into advocates; 2) the act of
formulating questions leads to premature deliberation; 3) jurors are likely to give
more weight to answers to questions posed amongst themselves than those posed
by counsel; 4) inappropriate questions, not in conformity with the rules of
evidence, will be asked; and 5) the objecting party risks estranging the jury.'58
In a 1999 case, United States v. Brockman,'59 the Eighth Circuit adopted
strong language and stated that it will continue to uphold the practice of allowing
jurors to question witnesses, but only where the enumerated procedures are used
148. Id.
149. 892 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1989).
150. Id. at 710.
151. Id. at 713-15.
152. 900 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1990). This case follows the holding of United States v. Land, 877 F.2d
17 (8th Cir. 1989).
153. 914 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1990).
154. Id. at 138. The Eighth Circuit found that where no objections are made to the practice during the
trial, the only review on appeal can be for plain error. Id. However, where there have been objections made
by counsel during the trial, the review rises to abuse of discretion. Id.
155. Id. at 138-9.
156. United States v. Greene, 998 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir. 1993).
157. Id.
158. See United States v. Brockman, 183 F.3d 891, 899 (8th Cir. 1999); Grene, 998 F.2d at 606;
United States v. Bascope-Zurita, 68 F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 1995).
159. 183 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1999).
to reduce the dangers."s6
9. Ninth Circuit
In a one-page, no-nonsense opinion, the Ninth Circuit declared juror
questioning appropriate, but did not discuss why. 6'
10. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit is unique; one state within the circuit outright allows the
practice ofjuror questioning, 162 and another state altogether banned the practice.' 63
However, when the Tenth Circuit took an appeal of a habeas corpus petition that
raised an issue with the practice, the court decided the case under Oklahoma state
law that allowed for jurors to ask questions of witnesses."16 Thus, this Circuit has
not yet addressed the issue under federal law.
11. Eleventh Circuit
This issue has not yet been addressed in the Eleventh Circuit.
In summary, a review of current federal case law demonstrates that the
inevitable finding among the circuits is that the practice of allowing jurors to
question witnesses is not prejudicial per se. Rather, it is a matter that is firmly
within a trial court's discretion, only to be reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion. Most circuits enumerate the dangers, caution against the practice
because of these dangers, and then allow the practice of allowing jurors to question
witnesses, as long as the district court employs procedural protections. With the
practice entrenched in judicial custom and case law, why then do the circuits
continue to waiver on the issue, and why are the courts reluctant to take a firm
stand on the matter? After fifty years why does so much controversy over the
practice continue, and why has a rule not been adopted to address the issue, that
either standardizes the practice under federal law or adopts an outright ban on its
use?
160. See Brockman, 183 F.3d at 899. Brockman itself does not list enumerated protection procedures,
but specifically followed the Eighth Circuit's earlier decision in Groene. Id. at 899 (citing Groene, 998
F.2d at 606) ("[I]fjuror questions are allowed, this trial court should carefully weigh using a procedure that
requires those questions to be submitted in writing or out of the hearing of [and with discussion with] other
jurors.").
161. See United States v. Gonzalez, 424 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1970).
162. Shackelford v. Champion, 156 F.3d 1244, 1998 WL 544363 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1150 (1999).
163. Allen v. State, 845 S.W.2d 907,907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
164. Shackelford, 1998 WL 544363, at *2.
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B. State Review
Most state courts have addressed the issue.'65 The following is a
representative sampling of the state courts that have discussed the practice of
jurors questioning witnesses. Unlike the federal circuits, there are a few states that
have placed absolute bans on the practice and prohibit the state courts from
allowing jurors to participate in witness questioning."6 Conversely, there are two
states that specifically allow jurors to question witnesses and have codified the
procedure.' 67
1. Arizona
Arizona addressed the issue in 1983 in State v. LeMaster. '68 In LeMaster, the
trial judge instructed the jurors prior to trial that they would be allowed to question
witnesses after each witness finished their testimony. 69 The judge instructed the
jurors to write out their questions and submit them to the court. 7° Depending on
whether the question was appropriate, the judge would ask the witness the juror-
derived question.' 7
After being convicted, the defendant appealed, contending that the entire
process "was improper and constituted reversible error."'7 The court held that
when a trial court permits juror questioning, certain procedures must be
followed. 7 3 The court enumerated the procedures to be implemented, adding that
165. See generally Wolff, supra note 6, at 818-19 & n.12.
166. See Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985, 990 (Miss. 1998); State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 380
(Neb. 1991); Allen, 845 S.W.2d at 907.
167. See Lawson v. State, 664N.E.2d773,780 (Ind. 1996); State v. Darcy N.K., 581 N.W.2d567 580
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
168. 669 P.2d 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
169. Id. at 596.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 597. The court outlined the procedures as follows: 1) The court should pre-instruct the jury
that they will be able to ask questions to clarify the testimony of any witness. 2) The court may declare a
recess or arrange a time for questions after each witness has testified. 3) The court should advise the jurors
that they are not to discuss their questions among themselves, and they should submit their written questions
to the bailiff. 4) The court should advise the jury that the court will decide whether or not to ask the
question and if the court does decide the question is appropriate, the court itself will ask the question. 5)
Each question will be reviewed by counsel and counsel should be given the opportunity to object to each
proposed question, both on the record and outside of the jury's presence. 6) If the question is irrelevant or
improper and prejudicial, the question shall not be asked. 7) After ajury question has been asked, counsel
will be given time to further question the witness regarding the issues brought up by the question and
the court does not condone the practice due to the inherent risks.'74
2. California
In 1979, a California court dealt with the issue of allowing jurors to question
witnesses. The practice was approved so long as the juror wrote out the question
and submitted it for the court and counsel's consideration, prior to the court asking
the question of the witness.'75
In a 1985 case, People v. McAlister,'76 the issue was revisited. McAlister
involved a juror verbalizing a question to the witness, in the presence of other
jurors. 177 The court found that the practice constituted error, but that such error
was not prejudicial. 118 Interestingly enough, the court declared that when a trial
court allows a juror to propose questions to witnesses, that juror is acting as a
representative of the court, 179 and it is then the duty of the court to ensure that
improper questions are not propounded.'80 Ultimately, the court articulated that
the practice is inherently dangerous and is discouraged. 181 In this case, however,
the court was limited to determining whether prejudice resulted from the
questioning that had occurred, and concluded that it had not.
82
3. Georgia
Georgia's original stance on juror questioning started with a demand that,
"juror[s] should not be permitted to examine a witness under any
circumstances."' 183 However, over the years there has been a slow progression to
a point where the practice is now allowed, so long as procedure is followed."8 In
State v. Story,'85 the defendant was convicted of child molestation.'86 During the
proceedings, over defense counsel's objections, the trial judge allowed two jury
members to ask questions of the victim. 187 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia stated that although questions of witnesses are not to be solicited among
a jury, if a juror upon his own initiative formulates a question regarding the
answer. Id.
174. Id. at 597-98.
175. People v. Gates, 158 Cal. Rptr. 759, 762 (Cal. 1979).
176. 213 Cal. Rptr. 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
177. Id. at 275-76.
178. Id. at 276.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 277.
182. Id.
183. Stinson v. State, 260 S.E.2d 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
184. Story v. State, 278 S.E.2d 97, 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
185. 278 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
186. Id. at 98.
187. Id.
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testimony of a witness, he should inform the judge that there is a juror question,
and procedures should then be implemented to facilitate the asking of the
question.'88
Georgia differs from most states in its allowance of the procedure, because an
admonition contained within the listed procedures requires that a question asked
of the witness must relate to a juror's understanding of a material issue in the
case. 1
8 9
4. Idaho
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Idaho decided State v. Tolman."9 The
defendant, after being convicted of various types of sexual misconduct, appealed
alleging that the trial court should not have allowed jurors to ask questions of the
witnesses.' 9' During the trial, a juror asked to question a witness and the judge
informed him that he could do so by writing down his question and submitting it
to the court.' 92 Only one question was submitted to which the state promptly
objected, outside of the jury's presence. 93 The trial judge informed the jury that
the question was not going to be answered."'4 However, the defendant argued on
appeal that the question which was submitted to the judge but not asked of the
witness was prejudicial to his defense, because the court did not inform the jury
which party's counsel made the objection. 95 The court did not rule on whether the
practice was proper or improper, and only determined that where a question is not
even asked, the practice is not prejudicial. 96
5. Indiana
Indiana courts began discussing this issue in the late 1960's, beginning with
Carter v. State.197 At the time of Carter, Indiana had no case law that dealt with
the practice of allowing or not allowing jurors to question witnesses.9 8 The
appellant in Carter argued that it was reversible error for the trial court, at the
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 828 P.2d 1304 (Idaho 1992).
191. Id. at 1305,1311.
192. Id. at 1306.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1311.
197. 234 N.E.2d 650 (Ind. 1968).
198. Id. at 651.
beginning of trial, to give an instruction prohibiting jurors from asking
questions.' The court agreed with the appellant, finding that although Indiana
had no case law on the matter, the majority ofjurisdictions at that time permitted
jurors to raise relevant questions, and therefore, an instruction prohibiting jurors
from asking questions deprived them of their right to do so.2" The court ended the
opinion with a proclamation that the practice is neither to be encouraged nor
forbidden by trial courts. 1
In a 1992 opinion, Stancombe v. State,2°2 the Indiana Court of Appeals refused
to rule on whether or not the questioning was an abuse of discretion per se, and
held that the Supreme Court of Indiana needed to outline a procedure if
questioning was allowed."0 3 The Indiana legislature subsequently codified the
procedure within Indiana Evidence Rule 614(d).2°
In a subsequent case, Lawson v. State,z°5 the court recognized the uniqueness
of the codification of the procedure 2' and held that this issue was so important that
the inclusion of this provision into Indiana's Rules of Evidence was intended and
purposeful.2 7 The court viewed this inclusion into Indiana's Rules of Evidence
as giving Indiana trial courts the discretion to allow jurors to question witnesses
during trial..21
6. Kansas
In 1994, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the issue as one of first
impression in State v. Hays."° In Hays, after a recess following the examination
of two witnesses, the jury, as a group, submitted two questions for one of the
witnesses. 2 ° The judge instructed the prosecutor to return the witness to the stand
199. Id.
200. Id. at 652. But cf. State v. Graves, 907 P..2d 963,967 (Mont. 1995) (holding that jurors "have no
inherent right to question witnesses").
201. Graves, 907 P.2d at 652.
202. 605 N.E.2d 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
203. See id. at 256.
204. Indiana Evidence Rule 614(d) provides:
(d) Interrogation by Juror. A juror may be permitted to propound questions to a witness by
submitting them in writing to the judge, who will decide whether to submit the questions to the
witness for answer, subject to the objections of the parties, which may be made at the time or
at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present. Once the court has ruled upon
the appropriateness of the written questions, it must then rule upon the objections, if any, of the
parties prior to submission of the questions to the witness.
IND. R. EvID. 614(d).
205. 664 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. 1996).
206. "Neither the federal nor uniform rules contain an equivalent of Indiana's Rule 614(d)." Id. at 780.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 883 P.2d 1093, 1098 (Kan. 1994).
210. Id. at 1097-98.
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and to ask her the questions put forth by the jury.2"
The defendant, on appeal, argued that allowing jurors to submit questions for
witnesses is contrary to Kansas state law because: 1) judges are required to
admonish the jury to abstain from communicating with anyone regarding the
trial," and 2) questioning explicitly "permits a jury to request information during
deliberations," thus "implicitly prohibits ajury from requesting information before
it begins deliberating."213
As a result of addressing the question for the first time in the 1990's, the
Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the holdings and rationale of many other
jurisdictions on the subject." 4 It ultimately elected to follow the majority of
jurisdictions and allow the practice. 15
The court found that no prejudice arose from the court having the prosecutor
ask the witness the jury's questions, but added that the trial judge should be the
one to do so.2t 6 The court, however, was troubled by the submission of the
questions by the jury as a whole, rather than by individual jurors." 7 The court
found that the questions presented by the jury revealed that they had been
discussing the case to such an extent as to bring about questions."' The court
found that this discussion amounted to jury deliberation. However, they held that
such deliberations failed to prejudice the defendant. 9
In its opinion, the court ultimately discouraged the practice, and articulated
the many risks associated with the implementation of the practice. However, the
court also outlined a procedure to be followed in the event a trial court, in its
211. Id. at 1098.
212. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3420(2) (1999). Section 22-3420(2) provides:
If the jury is permitted to separate, either during the trial or after the case is submitted to them,
they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or allow
themselves to be addressed by any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally submitted to them, and
that such admonition shall apply to every subsequent separation of the jury.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3420(2).
213. Hays, 883 P.2dat 1098; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3420(3). Section 22-3402 (3) provides: After
the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law or evidence arising
in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the court, where the information on the point of
the law shall be given, or the evidence shall be read or exhibited to them in the presence of the defendant,
unless he voluntarily absents himself, and his counsel and after notice to the prosecuting attorney. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3420(3).
214. Hays, 883 P.2d at 1099-1100.
215. ld. at 1102.
216. Id. at 1101-02.
217. Id. at 1102.
218. Id.
219. Id.
discretion, deems the practice appropriate."'
7. Michigan
Michigan courts first examined the issue in the 1972 case of People v.
Heard."2  In Heard, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that under certain
circumstances, a trial court, in its discretion, may allow jurors to question a
witness. 22 The Heard court appeared to limit the lower court's discretion to those
occasions where the questions presented would "help unravel otherwise confusing
testimony. '
223
In 1982, the court revisited the issue in People v. Stout.2" In Stout, the
defendant was tried and convicted of possession of marijuana and cocaine. 2 5
During trial, the court allowed a juror to orally articulate a question to an expert
witness, and the defense objected.226 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
holding in Heard was narrow in scope and the court should allow only questions
used to clarify a witness' testimony, not to gather additional information.227 The
Stout court held that Heard was not intended to limit juror questions to situations
that "unravel confusing testimony" but was intended to allow questioning by
jurors, as long as the questions aided in the fact-finding process.228
8. Mississippi
Mississippi is the newest member of the very small minority of states that
banned the practice ofjuror questioning. Over the years, Mississippi common law
has entertained various interpretations of this issue. In 1980, in Lucas v. State,2 9
the Supreme Court of Mississippi first considered a case involving the propriety
220. Id. The court reasoned:
Trial courts that permit jurors to submit questions to witnesses should maintain strict control
and should adhere to certain safeguards to minimize the risks associated with the practice. The
trial court should not solicit questions and should only permit them for purposes of clarification.
The testimony of a witness should not be interrupted by questions from jurors. Jurors should
submit questions in writing and without any discussion with other jurors. Counsel should be
afforded the opportunity to object outside the presence of the jury. The trial court must
determine the relevancy of the questions. The trial court should instruct the jury not to draw any
inference if a question submitted is not asked. The trial judge, rather than counsel or jurors,
should question the witness. Finally, counsel should be given the right to further examine the
witness following the jury's questions.
Id.
221. 200 N.W.2d 73 (Mich. 1972).
222. Id. at 76.
223. Id.
224. 323 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
225. Id. at 534.
226. Id. at 535.
227. Id. at 536.
228. Id.
229. 381 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1980).
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of allowing juror questioning.23 In Lucas, the court held:
[t]his court does not approve the practice of a trial court inviting jurors
to ask questions of witnesses. This privilege should only be granted
when, in the sound discretion of the trial judge, it appears that it will aid
a juror in understanding some material issue involved in the case and
then, ordinarily, when some juror has indicated that he wishes such a
point clarified.23
In a 1988 case, Myers v. State,232 the court went further on this issue than the
Lucas court, and while not forbidding the practice ofjuror questioning, the Lucas
court stated "this is a practice that should be discouraged."233 However, in a 1998
case, Wharton v. State,234 the Supreme Court of Mississippi overruled its previous
holdings and conclusively stated that "juror interrogation is no longer to be left to
the discretion of the trial court, but rather is a practice that is condemned and
outright forbidden by this court." '235 After enumerating the inherent problems,236
the court explained its change of heart in simple terms, "[olur prior warnings
concerning juror questioning have apparently gone unheeded on occasion." '237
9. Montana
Montana also addressed the issue as one of first impression in the 1990's in
State v. Graves.23 In Graves, the defense objected to the trial court's standing
230. Id. at 144.
231. Id.
232. 522 So. 2d 760 (Miss. 1988).
233. Id. at 762.
234. 734 So. 2d 985, 990 (Miss. 1998)
235. Id. at 990 (emphasis added).
236. Id. The court reasoned:
The most obvious problem with allowing jurors to question witnesses is the unfamiliarity of
jurors with the rules of evidence. ... Other potential problems include (1) Counsel may be
forced to either make an objection to a question in front of the juror who asks the question, at
the risk of offending the juror, or withhold the objection and permit prejudicial testimony to
come in without objection; (2) juror objectivity and impartiality may be lessened or lost; (3) if
ajuror submits a question in open court, the otherjurors are informed as to what the questioning
juror is thinking, which may begin the deliberation process before the evidence is concluded and
before final instructions from the court; (4) if the juror is permitted to question the witness
directly, the interaction may create tension or antagonism in the juror; and (5) the procedure
may disrupt courtroom decorum.
Id. (quoting State v. Hays, 883 P.2d 1093, 1099 (Kan. 1994)).
237. Id.
238. 907 P.2d 963 (Mont. 1995).
policy of allowing jurors to submit written questions of witnesses.239 During the
trial, the jury asked thirteen questions of witnesses.4 Defendant Graves, upon
conviction, appealed on the ground that allowing the jurors to ask questions
caused them to become advocates, and thus he was denied his right to a fair trial
by an impartial jury. 4
Because this was a case of first impression in Montana, the Montana Supreme
Court looked to federal circuit court holdings for guidance.242 After reviewing
various holdings and Montana's Rules of Evidence, 3 the court concluded that
"juror questioning of witnesses is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
judge."' However, the court held that jurors have no inherent right to question
witnesses and that it is not an appropriate practice for all cases or all witnesses. 5
Although the Montana Supreme Court found that the practice lies within a
trial judge's discretion and neither encouraged nor discouraged its use, the court
stated that it found the practice to be dangerous and outlined certain minimum
safeguards for its implementation.
10. Nebraska
Nebraska is another state that expressly forbids the practice of juror
questioning. In a 1991 case of first impression, State v. Zima,' 7 the Supreme
Court of Nebraska prohibited juror questioning of witnesses.24 In Zima, the
defendant was charged and convicted of driving under the influence and failing
to signal a turn. 9 Upon the conclusion of the questioning of each witness, the
trial judge invited jurors to ask questions of the witness." Based upon a series of
239. Id. at 963-64.
240. Id. at 964.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 964-66.
243. MoNT. R. EvID. 611 (a)(I). The justices appear to have partially based their allowance of the
procedure on Montana Rule of Evidence 61 l(a)(l). Graves, 907 P.2d at 967. Note that Montana Rule
of Evidence 61 l(a)(1) contains exactly the same wording as Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a)(l). See
discussion supra note 27-30 and accompanying text.
244. Graves, 907 P.2d at 966-67.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 967. The court stated:
[W]e conclude that if a judge, in his or her discretion, decides to allow this practice, certain
minimum safeguards must be implemented. These safeguards include: (1) the questions should
be factual, not adversarial or argumentative, and should only be allowed to clarify information
alread presented; (2) the questions should be submitted to the court in writing; (3) counsel
should be given the opportunity to object to the questions outside the presence of the jury; (4)
the trial judge should read the questions to the witness; and (5) counsel should be allowed to ask
follow-up questions.
ld.
247. 468 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1991).
248. Id. at 380.
249. Id. at 378.
250. Id.
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direct oral questions and answers between a juror and an expert witness, the State
moved for a mistrial, which the defendant resisted.25" ' On appeal, the defendant
argued that the colloquy between the juror and the witness "deprived him of a fair
and impartial jury and trial."25
In holding that they forbid juror questioning in Nebraska State Courts, the
justices stated that they felt the techniques used to mitigate the risks, so often
enumerated by other jurisdictions, do not deal with the issue of the effect of the
questioning on the impartiality of the jury.53 The justices based their holding
upon the fundamental premise that the judicial system "is an adversary one which
depends upon counsel to put before a lay fact finder that which should be admitted
in accordance with the rules of evidence and to keep from them that which should
not be received in evidence."254  The court argued that allowing jurors to
participate in the adversarial system risks turning these neutral-fact finders into
advocates and does not "suggest a fairer or more reliable truth-seeking
procedure." '55
Interestingly, Justice Shanahan, in a concurring opinion, objected to a rule
flatly prohibiting jurors from ever asking questions, based upon a reading of the
Nebraska Rules of Evidence and the holdings of other jurisdictions.256 In his
concurrence, Shanahan made an interesting point not seen in any other opinion,
"[i]nherent in a categorical condemnation of the practice which allows a juror's
question to a witness is a skepticism concerning every trial judge's capability to
manage interrogation and a suspicion about a jury's analytical and deductive
capacities." '257
11. New Jersey
In another case of first impression in the 1990's, State v. Jumpp,255 the
defendant appealed his conviction partially based upon one question that was
submitted by the jury.25 9 Defendant argued that allowing this question, which
admittedly caused a duplication of the witness' previous testimony, was prejudicial
251. Id. at 378-79.
252. ld. at 378.
253. Id. at 379.
254. Id. at 380.
255. Id.
256. State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377,380-81 (Neb. 1991) (Shanahan, J. concurring). Justice Shanahan
relied upon Nebraska Rules of Evidence 611 (1) and 614(2), which are comparable to Federal Rules of
Evidence 611 (a) and 614(b), respectively. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
257. Id. at 382.
258. 619 A.2d 602 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
259. Id. at 609.
to him because it allowed the jury to hear the same information twice. °
After looking to decisions of other jurisdictions, the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division, ultimately agreed with the majority ofjurisdictions that
allow juror questioning and held that the practice is within the discretion of the
trial court.261 As with most other jurisdictions, the court in Jumpp did not endorse
the practice, instead they enumerated the many inherent dangers and
recommended a procedure for implementation.262 However, unlike any other
jurisdiction, the court in Jumpp directed the lower courts not to implement the
practice until the New Jersey Supreme Court had ruled on the issue and, if
appropriate, established guidelines and procedures for its implementation.263
12. Nevada
Nevada courts condone the practice of allowing jurors to question witnesses.
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Nevada sanctioned the procedure in a 1998
case of first impression, Flores v. State.2 64 In Flores, the defendant was found
guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon and attempted murder with a deadly
weapon.265 He appealed, contending that allowing jurors to submit written
questions for the witnesses violated his right to a fair trial by impartial jury
pursuant to the Constitution and Nevada law.
266
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in light of the inherent dangers, and
260. Id. The testimony on direct examination included:
THE COURT: The question is, "When he [defendant] stated his name to you did he give you
a reason why he was turning himself in?" Did he just say, "I come to turn myself in?" what
happened?
THE WITNESS: He just stated, "I am turning myself in." At that point-
THE COURT: That's all. Is that all he said?
THE WITNESS: That's all.
THE COURT: Other than giving you his name and address?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Id. The question propounded by the jury and the witness' answer:
Q. How was it that you first saw [defendant]?
A. He had come in the front door of headquarters, I had come out of the communications
section and asked him if I could help him at which point he stated, "I came to turn myself in,"
and I asked him what his name was. He stated Rupert Jumpp. At that time I placed him in
custody and brought him to the detention area in the rear of headquarters.
Id.
261. Id. at 610.
262. Id. at 610-11.
263. Id. at 613.
264. 965 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1998).
265. Id. at 901.
266. Id. at 902. The Nevada law, which defendant refers to is NRS 175.401(3), states in pertinent part:
At each adjourment of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or depart for home
overnight, or are kept in charge of officers, they must be admonished by the judge or another
officer of the court that it is their duty not to:...form or express any opinion on any subject
connected with the trial until the cause is finally submitted to them.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.401(3) (1997).
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where the practice is firmly-rooted in "common law and American Jurisprudence",
the practice should be implemented in Nevada because it "can significantly
enhance the truth-seeking function of the trial process." '267
Instead of enumerating the inherent risks in the practice, the court in Flores
listed the potential benefits of the practice, including: "(1) increased juror
attentiveness; (2) the potential for jurors to more completely comprehend the
evidence; (3) the opportunity for trial attorneys to better understand the juror
thought processes and their perception of the case weaknesses; and (4) greater
juror satisfaction regarding their role at trial."2' The Flores court also
recommended that the usually mentioned safeguards269 be implemented to protect
against the risk of prejudice.27
13. Oklahoma
In 1942, in one of the earliest cases on the issue, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals considered the propriety of juror questioning in Krause v.
State.27' In Krause, the court held that it was proper for jurors to ask occasional
questions in order to clarify a statement of a witness, and that the exercise of the
procedure is ultimately left to the discretion of.the trial court.272
Forty-five years later in Cohee v. State,273"the same court reiterated its 1942
position. In Cohee, the defendant was convicted of unlawful delivery of a
controlled substance.274 Defendant's appeal was based upon the propriety of
allowing jurors to take notes during trial. 75 However, in ruling on that issue, the
court likened it to juror questioning and proceeded to reaffirm the Krause holding
by outlining procedures, similarly implemented elsewhere, to be used if juror
267. Flores, 965 P.2d at 902.
268. Id.
269. These safeguards include:
(1) initial jury instructions explaining that questions must be factual in nature and designed to
clarify information already presented; (2) the requirement that jurors submit their questions in
writing; (3) determinations regarding the admissibility of the questions must be conducted
outside the presence ofthe jury; (4) counsel must have the opportunity to object to each question
outside the presence of the jury; (5) an admonition that only questions permissible under the
rules of evidence will be asked; (6) counsel is permitted to ask follow-up questions; and (7) an
admonition that jurors must not place undue weight on the responses to their questions.
Id. at 902-03.
270. Id.
271. 132 P.2d 179 (Okla. Crim. App. 1942).
272. Id. at 182.
273. 942 P.2d 211 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
274. Id. at 211.
275. Id. at 212.
questioning is allowed in a trial.276 Consequently, in Oklahoma, the practice
continues to remain firmly within the discretion of the trial court.2"
14. Tennessee
In a 1982 decision, State v. Jeffries, 27 8 the defendant was convicted of selling
a controlled substance. 79 During the trial the trial court "allowed extensive
questioning covering forty-two pages of the transcript ... directed to the defense
witnesses"2" to be orally propounded by the jurors. 281' The Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals found that the jury had assumed the role of advocate and this
was therefore prejudicial to the defendant.28 2 The court further held that the trial
court abused its discretion by permitting this extensive examination of witnesses
by the jury and reversed Jeffries' conviction.283
15. Texas
In 1991, the Texas Court of Appeals heard Allen v. State2' as a matter of first
impression. In Allen, where the defendant was charged with possession of
controlled substances, the court informed the jury that they could submit written
questions to the court for the witnesses following the completion of examination. 285
Defendant Allen objected to the practice in its entirety and raised the issue on
appeal.286 The court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance and held that the
trial court was properly within its discretion to allow jurors to present questions
to the witnesses. 287 Allen then applied for discretionary review to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas.288
Between Allen's appellate hearing and his request for review, the Court of
Criminal Appeals had ruled on another case addressing the same issue, Morrison
v. State.219 In Morrison, the court held that "[a]llowing juror questioning of
witnesses in the criminal setting, is... impermissible, and any excursion into this
276. Id. at 214-15.
277. Id. at 214.
278. 644 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
279. Id. at 433.
280. Id. at 434.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 435.
283. Id. at 435. A great deal of the finding that the court had abused its discretion related to the fact that
the trial transcript contained 42 pages of questioning by the jury mainly directed to the defense witnesses.
Id. at 434-35.
284. 807 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
285. Id. at 639.
286. Id. at 642.
287. Id.
288. Allen v. State, 845 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
289. 845 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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area is error not subject to a harm analysis."' "9 The rationale behind this holding
was that "a change in our [trial] system involving intrusion of one component into
the function of another may only be established through the limited rule making
authority of this court, subject to disapproval by the legislature or by the legislature
in accordance with due process."291 Accordingly, the court reversed Allen's
conviction' and thereby effectively banned jurors from questioning witnesses in
state criminal courts in Texas.2 93
16. Virginia
In another case of first impression, Williams v. Commonwealth,' 4 a Virginia
trial court received one question in writing from a juror, proceeded to read the
question aloud, and without allowing the witness to answer, allowed the
prosecution to further pursue the subject.295 The defendant appealed, and the
Virginia Court of Appeals held that the practice of allowing jurors to ask questions
of witnesses is within the trial court's discretion, and will only be reviewed if there
is prejudice or a problem with the procedure adopted by that court.2'
Furthermore, even after citing the problems inherent in the practice, the Williams
court chose not to discourage the practice, provided that the lower courts
implemented procedural protections."
In summary, all of the federal circuits and a majority of the states that have
addressed the issue of whether the court should permit jurors to question witnesses
have allowed the practice to continue under the guise of judicial discretion,
provided that procedural protections were followed.29 Only three states have been
bold enough to place an outright ban on the practice: Texas, Mississippi and
Nebraska.2' One state, Indiana, saw fit to codify the practice and incorporate it
into its rules of evidence.3m Another state, New Jersey, still awaits a state Supreme
Court ruling before its lower courts can espouse the practice. 30' There is still,
however, a question that needs to be addressed by those states that allow the
290. Allen, 845 S.W.2d at 907.
291. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 889.
292. Allen, 845 S.W.2d at 907.
293. Id.
294. 484 S.E.2d 153 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
295. Id. at 153-154.
296. Id. at 155.
297. Id.
298. See discussion supra Part IV.
299. See supra notes 230, 248 & 285 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
practice: Do the benefits, such as making the juror feel more positive about his
experience and being more involved in trial, really outweigh the inherent dangers
of prejudice, premature deliberation, and loss of neutral fact-finding?
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE CASE LAW
The current trend of appellate courts to quietly sidestep the issue of juror
questioning by promulgating the use of trial court discretion, and by adding the
caveat that the practice should only be used in very rare instances because of its
inherent dangers, needs to be remedied. Courts and legislatures should
realistically examine the inherent dangers and realize that the benefits of the
practice are substantially outweighed by the loss of neutrality among the fact-
finders and the resulting prejudice to the criminal defendant.
One court listed the benefits derived from jurors questioning witnesses as "(1)
increased juror attentiveness; (2) the potential for jurors to more completely
comprehend the evidence; (3) the opportunity for trial attorneys to better
understand the jurors' thought processes and their perception of the case
weaknesses; and (4) greater juror satisfaction regarding their role at trial."'
However, these "possible" benefits are swamped by the frequently stated and
subsequently ignored inherent dangers. 3 The fact remains that courts weighing
these benefits are pandering to juries who lack an attention span exceeding six
minutes.'
Despite our changing times, our judicial system still ultimately depends upon
the existence of highly trained attorneys representing each side, with a neutral
fact-finder in the middle.3 5 The attorney's role has always been to elicit relevant,
pertinent information to persuade the neutral fact-finder.' The neutral fact-finder
is supposed to remain uninvolved in the unfolding of the case and to independently
evaluate the information that has been presented to them, not what they have
discovered on their own.3 " Perhaps this argument is best articulated by the
Nebraska Supreme Court, which stated that the judicial system "is an adversary
one which depends upon counsel to put before lay fact finders that which should
be admitted in accordance with the rules of evidence and to keep from them that
which should not be received in evidence. '308
The purported benefits of allowing attorneys to better understand the jurors'
thought processes and their perception of the weaknesses in the case is inapposite
302. Flores v. State, 965 P.2d 901,902 (Nev. 1998).
303. See supra Part 11.
304. See Linda S. Crawford, A Clear Look at Jury Confusion, 14 No. 12 MED. MAUPRACTICE L. &
STRATEGY 4 (1997).
305. Wolff, supra note 6, at 828.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Neb. 1991).
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to our adversarial system. Additionally, these benefits could be viewed, as a
corollary, to a violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 606.' The Advisory
Committee Notes to this rule state that the "central focus has been upon insulation
of the manner in which the jury reached its verdict, and this protection extends to
each of the components of deliberation, including arguments, statements,
discussions, mental and emotional reactions, votes, and any other feature of the
process."3 ' If juror questioning leads to premature deliberations as so many
authorities suggest,3 ' then the questions jurors ask in the courtroom during these
"premature deliberations" should fall under Rule 606; and either the attorneys or
the court should be viewed as violating Rule 606 when he or she derives any
information from these internal processes.
Because the inherent dangers so greatly outweigh the benefits and possibly
violate existing rules, a blanket ban should be placed upon the practice of jurors
questioning witnesses. However, making such a change would involve a serious
departure from precedent and judicial custom, and many courts and legislatures
would be unwilling to invoke such severe action. Therefore, at bare minimum,
there should be a movement to enact a new rule of Federal Evidence or Criminal
Procedure.
Manyjurisdictions addressing the issue ofjuror questioning of witnesses have
already promulgated procedure to define when a trial judge may determine that
juror questioning is required.3"2 With very few exceptions,313 there are no statutory
rules that outline the procedure. The two relevant Federal Rules of Evidence, 611
and 614,3 ' do not sufficiently address the issue. In order to fill the void, prevent
future error, and circumvent the inherent problems within the meshing ofjudicial
discretion and prejudice to the criminal defendant, Federal Rule of Evidence 611
309. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Rule 606(b) states:
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that ajuror may testify
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to thejury' s
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor
may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about
which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
Id.
310. FED. R. EvID. 606(b) advisory committee's notes (emphasis added).
311. United States v. Douglas, 81 F.3d 324,326 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333,
336 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir. 1993).
312. See discussion generally supra Parn IV.
313. See supra note 205.
314. Seesupranotes27-31.
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or 614 should be amended, or a new Rule of Evidence or Criminal Procedure
should be enacted, to include the oft-mentioned procedural protections necessary
in juror questioning of witnesses.
VI. PROPOSAL
The new rule should contain the following parts in some way, shape, or form:
1.) Trial courts should not routinely encourage juror questioning in criminal
trials, and its use should be strictly limited.
2.) If a trial is determined, through pre-determined means (e.g., a list of
predetermined criteria or list of appropriate types of cases, i.e., antitrust,
conspiracy) to be sufficiently complex as to warrant the use of juror questioning,
the jurors should be given preliminary instructions, prior to the start of the trial,
advising them that this procedure will be allowed and explaining to them the
procedure to be used.
3.) The jurors should be informed that upon the conclusion of the examination of
each witness both parties will ask them if they have any questions for that witness.
The jury should be advised that only questions that are relevant, allowable within
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and aimed at clarifying information about which
witnesses have previously testified will be entertained. If the jurors do have
question(s), they are to raise their hand(s) to inform the court, and then they are
to write down the question, without disclosing or discussing the question/issue to
any other juror, and give it to the bailiff, who will give it to the court. Jurors
under no instances are to verbalize a question in open court. If a juror verbalizes
a question in open court, that juror should be dismissed.
4.) After receiving a question from a juror, the judge should call a recess, remove
the jury from the jury box, and then, out of the presence of the jury and on the
record, read the question(s), allow counsel to read the question(s), and entertain
any objections of counsel.
5.) If the judge determines that the question is inappropriate, the jury as a whole
should be informed that the question may not be asked, and the judge should
explain the reason-violates Federal Rules of Evidence, not relevant, not at issue
in this case, etc.-and inform the jury that they are not to draw any inference from
the fact that the question(s) may not be asked.
6.) If the judge rules that the question(s) may be asked, the jury should be
returned to the jury box, and the judge should ask the question(s) to the witness
after rephrasing the question(s) in correct legal format, conforming with the
Federal Rules of Evidence or Criminal Procedure.
7.) After the witness has answered the question(s), the court should permit
counsel for both parties, if so desired, to redirect or re-cross-examine the witness
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on only the facts or issues brought out by the juror-inspired question. 15
VII. CONCLUSION
"The blindfold on Justice is not a gag."
316
While a bright-line rule banning juror questioning is ultimately preferred, a
jury in exceptional times may have a pertinent, relevant question that needs to be
answered before they can reach a fair and well-reasoned verdict. However, juror
questioning of witnesses is neither a right nor a traditional role of the jury.
Therefore, because its dangers significantly outweigh the "possible" benefits, it
should not be allowed. In those phenomenal instances where it cannot be avoided,
it should then be subject to review as error apparent of record.317
The proposed Rule of Evidence or Criminal Procedure is a good remedy for
this problem because it will lessen the prejudicial effect of juror questioning on a
criminal defendant. Additionally, a widesweeping adoption of the proposed rule
will lessen the controversy over the use of the practice, eliminate needless use of
juror questioning, bring validity to the practice, and protect the integrity of our
legal system.
Some measure needs to be taken to prevent future instances of juror
questioning from interfering with the rights of criminal defendants. Even though
most uses of juror questioning are found to be harmless error, they are nonetheless
still error, and error should be remedied.
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315. The above recommended prophylactic measures were inspired by the procedures enumerated in
several cases and those codified in Indiana's Rule of Evidence 614(d). See generally United States v.
Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993); State v. LeMaster, 669 P.2d 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); State v.
Hays, 883 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1994); State v. Graves, 907 P.2d 963 (Mont. 1995); Flores v. State, 965 P.2d
901 (Nev. 1998); IND. R. EvtD. 614(d).
316. State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Neb. 1991) (Shanahan, J., concurring).
317. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 543 (6th ed. 1990). Error apparent of record is defined as "[p]lain,
fundamental error that goes to the foundation of the action irrespective of the evidence; an obvious
misapprehension of the applicable law." Id. (citing Parks v. Parks, 98 F.2d 235, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1938)).
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